Cebes' theory of the soul from Plato's Phaedo:
My feeling is that the argument is where it
      was, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am
      ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the
      bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite
      sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still,
      in my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of
      Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more
      lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul
      very far excels the body. Well, then, says the argument to me, why do you
      remain unconvinced?—When you see that the weaker continues in
      existence after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting
      must also survive during the same period of time? Now I will ask you to
      consider whether the objection, which, like Simmias, I will express in a
      figure, is of any weight. The analogy which I will adduce is that of an
      old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says:—He is not
      dead, he must be alive;—see, there is the coat which he himself wove
      and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to
      ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the
      coat which is in use and wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts
      far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of
      the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains. But
      that, Simmias, as I would beg you to remark, is a mistake; any one can see
      that he who talks thus is talking nonsense. For the truth is, that the
      weaver aforesaid, having woven and worn many such coats, outlived several
      of them, and was outlived by the last; but a man is not therefore proved
      to be slighter and weaker than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the
      soul may be expressed in a similar figure; and any one may very fairly say
      in like manner that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and short lived
      in comparison. He may argue in like manner that every soul wears out many
      bodies, especially if a man live many years. While he is alive the body
      deliquesces and decays, and the soul always weaves another garment and
      repairs the waste. But of course, whenever the soul perishes, she must
      have on her last garment, and this will survive her; and then at length,
      when the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly
      decompose and pass away. I would therefore rather not rely on the argument
      from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after
      death. For granting even more than you affirm to be possible, and
      acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth, but also that
      the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist after death, and will
      be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in
      the soul which will hold out and be born many times—nevertheless, we
      may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of
      successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and
      utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings
      destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can
      have had any experience of it: and if so, then I maintain that he who is
      confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to
      prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he
      cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always
      have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may
      utterly perish.
    
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Argument for limits on how many times you can be raised? ;)
ReplyDeleteRight, and not to say that they've gone permanently to any hereafter. At least some chance of absolute dissolution seems philosophically reasonable. (Moreso than Socrates IMO.)
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